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NOTES
A REVIEW OF CERTAIN SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN TRACING TRUST

FUNDs*-One claiming a preference by reason of a trust relation
against the assets of an insolvent bank is generally faced with a practical problem of considerable difficulty. In the event that the claimant establishes that the bank was a trustee, real or constructive, one
point vital to his case has been proved. But, the establishment of a
trust relation does not of itself entitle the plaintiff to recover,' It is
further necessary that he identify or reach his property in some way
recognized by equity. This process of identification is termed tracing.
Hence it is said that the right of the cestui que trust depends upon
his ability to trace, or that the right of pursuit fails when the means
of ascertainment fails.2 Forierly the plaintiff was required to trace
his specific property. 3 Equity followed that property only, and only
until an innocent purchaser for value intervened. But by modem
rules, the equitable interest not only attaches to the specific property,
but also to its proceeds in their converted form until detached by the
superior equity of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, or
until these proceeds have been dissipated.'
A brief survey of fundamentals discloses the reason for the necessity of tracing. To recoup himself, a cestui que trust whose money
has been converted by the trustee, has an election between two alternatives in ren remedies. 5 First, he may claim by way of constructive trust the property or the proportionate part of the property
bought with the trust money. Secondly, he may assert a lien against
the specific fund or property into which his money has gone. By the
great weight of authority, the lien remedy does not give a charge on
the general assets of the trustee's estate.( To hold otherwise would
*Editor'sNote-For the purpose of clarity, throughout this note, A will be
used to denote a cestui que trust, B a trustee, and C a correspondent bank.
'Seeley v. Seeley Howe LeVan Co., 128 Iowa 294, 1o3 N. W. 961 (1905);
Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, io5 N. Y. 256, Ix N. E. 504 (1887) ; Groff v. City
Savings Fund and Trust Co., 46 Pa. Super. 423 (i911).

'Newton v. Porter, 69 N. Y. 133 (1877) ; Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. i6
(853) ; Lifter v. Earle Co., 72 Pa. Super. 179 (919) ; 3 STORy, EQurrY JuRIsPRUDENCE (r 4 th ed. i918) § 1666.

S:Phillips v. Thompson, 3 Lev. i91 (Eng. 1675).
'Furber v. Dane, 204 Mass. 412, 9o N. E. 859 (91o);

Warren v. Union
Bank of Rochester, 157 N. Y. 259, 51 N. E. 1o36 (1898) ; O'Neil v. O'Neil, 227

Pa. 334, 76 Atl. 26 (igio).
5
Ames, Following MisappropriatedProperty Into Its Product (igo6) ig
HARv. L. REV. 511; 3 POmEROY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 19x8) § 1049.

"Spokane County v. First City National Bank, 68 Fed. 979 (C. C. A. gth,

1895) ; Lowe v. Jones, 192 Mass. 94, 78 N. E. 402 (igo6) ; Watts v. Newberry,
107 Va. 233, 57 S. E. 657 (1907).
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confuse the in personam liability of the trustee, a simple equitable
debt,7 with the lien remedy which is in remn.
Clearly the im personani
right against the trustee by its very nature precludes any possibility
of preference. Among creditors equality is equity.9 Further, if the
trustee is insolvent, a preference is necessary to make the claimant
whole. Hence the only advantageous remedies against an insolvent lie
in rem. Naturally, then, there must be a res indicated against which
to proceed. It is for this purpose of setting apart the res that tracing
is necessary and becomes a condition precedent to the cestui que trust's
success.
The fact situations are as numerous as the possible courses of
action within the power of the trustee, and involve as many complicating elements. This note purposes to deal with a limited field of
tracing questions raised by several typical cases litigated during the
last twenty years, and by means of this consideration to discuss a
Pennsylvania case recently decided.3 0
I.
A owned X stock. B Co. were A's brokers. A ordered B Co. to
sell said stock. B sold it, received the proceeds, and deposited them at
the C bank in B Co.'s general account, which never fell below the
amount claimed by plaintiff A. Then B Co. sent A a check drawn
to A on C bank. Before A presented this check B Co. had assigned
for the benefit of creditors. C bank refused payment. Plaintiff A
sued defendant assignee of B Co., claiming to have traced his money
into the account at the C bank. Held, that plaintiff is entitled to
preference. Webb v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135, 117 Atl. 793 (1922).
The court freely admitted that the mere giving of the check
added no substance to A's claim for preference. It also conceded
that the wrongful act of the fiduciary B raised a trust relation between
the parties. The decision proceeded directly upon the theory A had
identified his property. The case then stands for a well settled rule.
When a trustee improperly mingles the money of a beneficiary with
his own, but not with money against which others have equitable
claims, proof that the trustee's balance at all times exceeded the beneficiary's claims will entitle the latter to preference."1
Assuming there
have been no withdrawals by the trustee, logic demands such conclusion. But in the event the trustee has drawn out money, the

'3

§ io8o.
v. Roedenbeck 227 Fed. 346 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); 3 PolmERoy,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1048 and note.
'Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, supra note I.
"Cameron v. Carnegie Trust Co., 292 Pa. 114, 14o Atl. 768 (1928).
'Semble, Vosburgh's Estate, 279 Pa. 329, 123 Atl. 813 (1924).
=Knatchbull v. Hallet, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879); Central National
Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54 (i88i) ; Patek v. Patek, I66 Mich 446, 131
N. W. "oi (1g) ; Bank v. Weems, 69 Tex. 489, 6 S. W. 802 (M888).
POMEROy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. i918)

8Macy
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result seems surprising. The burden of proof rests upon the claimant. He has not identified his property nor its proceeds. However,
courts, in their endeavor to aid the beneficiary, apply the so-called
"presumption of honesty." 13 After proof that the beneficiary's
money went into the general fund, they will presume, when possible 14
and beneficial,'5 that the trustee remains true to his trust, and withdraws his own money, leaving the claimant's on deposit. By this
artificial means the cestui que trust has traced his property to the
court's satisfaction.
The Pennsylvania court, in reaching this conventional result,
pronounced an important dictum :16
"Had [B] used [A's money] for their own purposes, and
placed other funds in the account, an entirely different case
would have been presented, as there would bad the agent [B]
been a banking institution and mingled the funds with those of
others in the general course of business."
In view of this suggested distinction, an allied case will be
considered.
II.
A deposited trust funds in B bank, B agreeing to act as trustee. B
bank, contrary to law,17 mingled this trust fund with its general money,
then became insolvent. At all times the general funds exceeded the
amount of A's trust fund. A sued defendant, receiver of B bank,
claiming a preference. Held, that plaintiff is not entitled to a preference. Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co. (No. 2), 250 Pa. 378,
95 Atl, 577 (1915).
Plaintiff argued that since the amount of B bank's general fund
never fell below the amount of his claim, the trustee must be presumed to have drawn out its own funds and left plaintiff's money
on deposit at all times. This contention was based upon the line of
"Peoples' National Bank v. Moore, 25 F. (2d) 599 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928);
Vosburgh's Estate, supra note II.
"The trustee may show that he dissipated the beneficiary's money or prove
some other fact preventing application of the presumption. Heidelbach v.
Campbell, 95 Wash. 661, 164 Pac. 247 (1917). Redeposits in the mixed account
will not be impressed with a trust in the absence of proof that such was the
trustee's intent. Iowa Bank v. Cable, 197 Iowa 393, 197 N. NV. 434 (1924);

Miller's Appeal, 218 Pa. 50, 66 Atl. 995 (19o7).
"When the presumption would not work to the advantage of the cestui que
trust, it is not applied. Herslet v. Oatway [1903] 2 Ch. 356; In re A. 0. Brown
& Co., i89 Fed. 432 (S. D. N. Y. 1911).
'G274 Pa. 135, 138, 117 Adt. 793, 794 (922).
' 7 It is the duty of the trustee to keep the trust funds separate from his own.
Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Scandinavian Bank, 130 Wash. 33, 225 Pac. 825
(924) ; 3 SToRY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1678.
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decisions giving rise to the rule announced under Group I. The
instant decision held that this presumption did not apply where the
trustee was a banking institution chartered to handle the funds of
others, because the reason for the rule failed. 18
This case represents another tracing principle, well settled in
Pennsylvania, 9 although not generally held elsewhere.2 0 The mere
showing that the beneficiary's trust money was mingled with the
general fund of a banking institution, and that fund always exceeded
plaintiff's contribution, is not sufficient to entitle him to a preferential
claim. 2 1 Such proof does not establish the vital fact that the cestui's
money reached the hands of the receiver.2 2 The real basis for allowing preference in any case is that (i) in equity the money claimed
belongs to the cestui que trust; (2) the trustee's creditors should
2 3
not profit by their debtor's breach of trust..
Neither of these
reasons could apply unless the trust money came into the possession
of the receiver. The Pennsylvania case proceeds upon the premise
that banks are chartered to handle the money and trust funds of many
persons. Many could offer the bare proof that their trust money
went into B's general funds. Proof of this single fact casts no fair
light upon the present whereabouts of the trust res. There seems no
reason to recognize to the very possible detriment of creditors the pre' See Downing v. Cunningham, 256 Mass. 285, 152 N. E. 365 (1926).
Philadelphia National Bank v. Dowd, 38 Fed. 172 (E. D. N. C. 1889);
Commonwealth v. Tradesman's Trust Co. No. 3, 250 Pa. 383, 95 Ati. 578
(1915) ; Lebanon Tr. & Safe Dep. Bank's Assigned Estate, 166 Pa. 622, 31 At.
334 (i895); Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. x6 (1853); Groff v. City Savings
Fund and Trust Co., supra note i; Assigned Estate of Solicitors Loan and Trust
Co., 3 Pa. Super. 244 (I897).
-' Generally courts are willing to apply the presumption of honesty to both
individual and banking house trustees thus granting preference without distinction. Richardson v. New Orleans Co., lO2 Fed. 780 (C. C. A. 3d, 19oo) ; Eifel
v. Veigel, 169 Minn. 281, 211 N. W. 332 (1926); Emigh v. Earling, 134 Wis.
565, 115 N. W. 128 (igo8). This seems true even when the trust money of
several cestui que trusts is mingled together with the general money. Preferences are determined inter sese by means of the "first in first out" rule. Empire
State Surety Co. v. Carrol County, 194 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) ; Lowell v.
Brown, 284 Fed. 936 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922) noted in (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rxv. 567
(advocating pro rata distribution as the more equitable rule). See Downing v.
Cunningham, supra note 18, Raban v. Cascade Bank, 33 Mont. 413, 84 Pac. 72

(igo6).

Some courts, although indulging in no presumption of honesty, hold such
proof shifts the burden of proof to the receiver to show that the cestui que trust's
money has been dissipated or paid out. Eastman v. Farmers' State Bank of
Olivia, 221 N. W. 236 (Mich. 1928); City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 64 Neb. 822,
go N. W. 905 (19o2).
' Lowe v. Jones, supra note 6; Arnold Invention Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 98
Kan. 412, 158 Pac. 68 (1916) ; Slater v. Oriental Mills, 18 R. I. 352, 27 Atl.
443 (893).
'Lucas Co. v Jamison, 17o Fed. 338 (S. D. Iowa i9o8) ; Bettendorf Wheel
Co. v. Mast Co., 187 Fed. 59o (C. C. A. 6th, 1911) ; O'Connor v. O'Connor, 291
Pa. 114, 139 Atl. 734 (1927).
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ferred claim of a beneficiary who has failed to trace his property with
greater certainty. The opinion indicates such a result would not be
wholesome for the community. 24 However, the problem presented by
Group III will point out a possible qualification to this principle.
III.
Plaintiff A held drafts drawn upon X, and selit same for collection to B bank where X was a depositor. To pay A, B bank then
sent forward funds to the C bank, charged X's account with the
amount of the draft, drew drafts on C bank payable to A, and immediately thereafter became insolvent. Hence, at the time of B's
insolvency, C bank had a credit balance due B bank more than
sufficient to pay the drafts. When A presented said drafts for
payment, defendant, receiver of B bank, had stopped payment. Plaintiff A sued defendant receiver, claiming to have traced his money
into that amount turned over to defendant by C bank. Held, that
plaintiff A was not entitled to preference. Conmonwealth v. State
Bank, 216 Pa. 124, 64 Atl. 923 (19o6).25
The plaintiff contended first that these facts created a trust in
his favor; secondly that the sending forward of the money to the
C bank was such an appropriation from the general funds of B
bank as identified it as the money collected for plaintiff. The court
admitted the trust relation, but denied the validity of the other
argument. The court said :26
"Nor are we prepared to say that the sending of moneys to
[C] . . . to pay any of the drafts is an identification of the
moneys collected by [B] . . . for [A] . . . It is true that
the moneys were intended by [B] . . . to be used in the payments of the amounts collected for the claimants, and in place
of the moneys collected, but the circumstances fall short of
identifying them as the moneys which [B] . . . held as their
agent. Unless identified, it is manifest the moneys cannot be
successfully claimed by . . . [A]."
This case by its holding adds a further principle, namely that
the drawing of a draft on the correspondent C bank does not amount
to an assignment of funds in the amount thereof to A, and does
not create a fund distinct from the general funds of the trustee
bank.2 The
Negotiable Instruments Law codifies this generally ac28
cepted rule.
24

1928)

See Apple v. Hert, x22 Okla. 153, 252 Pac. 823 (1927).
Semble, Burnes National Bank v. Spurway, 28 F. (2d) 40 (D. C. Iowa
; Freiberg v. Stoddard, 161 Pa. 259, 28 Atl. 111 (1894).

-62 6 Pa. 124, 126, 64 Ad. 923,

924

(i9o6).

"Fourth Street National Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634 (896) ; Clark v.
Toronto Bank, 72 Kan. 1, 82 Pac. 582 (905) ; Covert v. Rhodes, 48 Ohio St. 66,
27 N. E. 94 (i8gr).
'

Sees. 127, 18q.
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In Freiberg v. Stoddard,29 involving exactly similar facts, the
court employed a different argument in denying preference to A.
It showed that when B bank collected A's draft by charging the
drawee's account, nothing was added to B bank's assets.30 Dicta in
a considerable number of cases have pointed out that if A, the beneficiary, can show that the B bank's assets as they came into the bands
of the receiver were actually increased by the whole or a definite
part of the misappropriated trust fund, justice demands that A, and
not 'the other creditors, should have the benefit of that increase.3 1
This constitutes a qualification to the Tradesman case rule mentioned under Group II. However, by general opinion, an increase
in assets is not shown by proof the trust fund has gone in payment
of B bank's debts or the expenses of B's business.32 . Such payment
by B bank merely serves to cancel a liability. Furthermore, one
writer has suggested that to establish a definite increase in assets
as they came into the receiver's hands would always involve an
identification of the trust fund.38 Therefore, this qualification proves
of small practical benefit to the claimant. A fourth case will serve
to indicate a slightly different problem.
IV.
A owned certain bonds. She deposited them in the B bank.
The cashier of B bank stole these bonds, sold them, and deposited
the proceeds of the sale in C bank to the account of B bank. C bank
already had a small credit balance due B bank. B bank became insolvent. The balance in C bank always remained larger than plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff A sued defendant receiver of B, claiming
the full amount of the sale. Held, that the plaintiff can recover.
Conneauiville Bank's Assigned Estate, 280 Pa. 545, 124 Atl. 745
(1924).

This result would be reached in a majority of jurisdictions
today.3" The very money to which plaintiff's equity attached acSupra note 25.
Steele Co. v. Spurway, 28 F. (2d) 42 (D. C. Iowa 1928) ; American Can
Co. v. Williams, 178 Fed. 420 (C. C. A. 2d, igio).
'o

Empire State Surety Co. v. Carrol County, supra note 2o. Drover's and
Mechanics National Bank v. Roller, 85 Md. 495, 37 Atl. 30 (1897) ; see 3 PomEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. i918) § 1048 (e) at p. 2387.
'In re See 209 Fed. 172 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Italian Fruit Co. v. Penniman
and Carrington, 1o Md. 698, 61 Atl. 694 (19o5); Muhlenberg v. Northwestern
Loan and Trust Co., 26 Ore. 132, 38 Pac. 932 (1894).
'Ames, Following MisappropriatedProperty Into Its Product (i9o6) ig
HARV. L. REv. 511, 521. See Corn Exchange National Bank v. Solicitor's Loan
and Trust Co., 188 Pa. 330, 41 At. 536 (1898).
'Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562 (Eng. 18t5) ; Noble v. Noble, ig9 Cal.
128, 243 Pac. 439 (1926) ; First National Bank v. Eastern Trust and Bldg. Co.,
io8 Me. 79, 79 Atl. 4 (1911) ; See also cases cited supra notes 2o and 21; cf.
Evansville Bank v. German American Bank 155 U. S. 556 (895).
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tually went into the C bank. B's account there was swelled to that
exact amount. C bank had no claim upon the fund. There remained
only A and B to consider. B could not claim to be an innocent purchaser for value for obvious reasons. It is true this balance in C's
hands constituted an asset of B. On the other hand, A has traced his
property into this particular asset. It is not the case of mingling misappropriated money with the general money in B bank. Because of
this factual difference, this case does not fall within the reasoning
of Freiberg v. Stoddard, Group III. For the same reason it does
not deny the dictum in Webb v. Newhall, that it would be a different
case were the trustee a banking institution.35 With these considerations
in mind, a fifth situation is presented for discussion.
V.
A sent B bank a note indorsed for collection. B bank to its
knowledge was insolvent, but it accepted .the note and collected cash
for the amount due from X, who was not a depositor of B bank.
B bank mingled the money collected with it general funds. To pay
A it then drew a draft on C bank payable to A. C had a credit
balance due B bank, which balance was at all times greater than the
amount of A's note. A presented the draft, but defendant, receiver
of B bank, had stopped payment. Plaintiff A sued defendant receiver,
claiming preference. Cameron v. Carnegie Trust Co., 292 Pa. 114,
14o Atl. 768 (1928).
B was a banking institution, not an individual. By the rule
of the Tradesman case, Group II, the "presumption of honesty"
is not applicable in the case of an institution chartered to handle the
funds of others. A has shown no more than the fact that his
money was mingled with the general money in B bank. Hence his
case is sustained by neither presumption nor proof. Therefore, under
this Pennsylvania theory it appears A has not sufficiently identified
his property. However, Group III suggested a qualification to this
rule. B's assets were increased by the collection of A's note. Yet
to take the case out of the general principle, not only an increase in
assets is required, but an increase in assets when those assets come
into the hands of the receiver. The latter is a very different proposition. Under Group III, it was pointed out that the payment of B's
debts or running expenses with A's money did not amount to such
an increase. As before stated, the burden of proof rests on plaintiff.
Therefore, unless A can show B had not dissipated nor used his
money in one of these ways, he has not sustained the required burden.
From the facts given, A gave no evidence on this point.
Furthennore, this is not the case of B collecting cash and sending that very money to C, where B already had a credit balance.
Language should be construed in the light of the facts concerning which it
is written. Johnson v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co., io5 Iowa 273, 277, 75 N. W.
IOr, I02 (1898).
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Such a situation would probably be governed by Bank of Conneautvile, supra Group IV. Here B sent no money to C, but merely a
draft. An unaccepted draft is not money, nor equivalent to it. 30
It is a mere order."' Such an order as shown by Comnsonvealth v.
State Bank, Group III, and Webb v. Newhall, Group I, does not
constitute an assignment to A in the amount thereof, nor an appropriation from the general assets of B.
There remains a further question. In the Tradesman case,
Group II, an express trust existed before B wrongfully mingled
A's money with its general funds.38 In the case under consideration,
B's wrongful act in taking A's note while insolvent raised the sole
trust relation between the parties. Does this difference create a
distinction? Some few courts notably California and Iowa, have
held in the affirmative.39 They have been willing to apply the "presuption of honesty" in cases where B bank was trustee of an express
trust, thus granting recovery where the Tradesman case denied it.
On the other hand, they have refused to apply the presumption
where the only trust relation resulted from B's wrongful or criminal
act. The latter is the situation in the case under discussion. Such
a distinction, then, would prove no aid to A under these facts, for
without this presumption he has not maintained his case. Upon
this reasoning A has failed to identify his property. Therefore,
his right to be preferred has failed.
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held 'A entitled to
preference.40 In so deciding, the Court distinguished, but did not
overrule former holdings. The award was grounded upon two
premises: first, that the cash collected by B actually increased its
assets-this, as before indicated, seems inconsistent with the Tradesman case; secondly, that B was a trustee e.x maleficio. The latter fact,
according to the Court, raised a higher equity in favor of A than
where the ordinary cestui que trust is wronged by the misappropriation of the trust property by the trustee. This view presents a direct antithesis to the California and Iowa view above mentioned.
Generally an acceptance or acts deemed equivalent to acceptance before the
drawer's insolvency gives the holder a right to the full value of the paper.
Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Bank, 162 N. E. 42 (Ohio 1928). For discussion,
see note (928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 735.
' Clark v. Toronto Bank, supra note 27, I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (5th ed. i9o3) § 27.

' It may be possible to distinguish the Tradesman case from the Cameron
case by the fact that it affirmatively appeared in the former that the trust funds
of several cestui que trusts were intermingled. It did not so appear in the latter.
However, the Pennsylvania court did not use this as the reason for its nonapplication of the Tradesman rule to the facts of the Cameron case. See Raban
v. Cascade Bank, supra note 20; Downing v. Cunningham, supra note L8.
People v. California Safe Deposit,& Trust Co., 175 Cal. 756, 167 Pac. 388
(,917) ; Oelke v. First State Bank of Corwith, 149 Iowa 662, 129 N. W. 70

(1gio).

• This conclusion would seem to be in line with the general view. Patek v.
Patek, Bank v. Weems, both supra note 12; see cases supra notes 20 and 2r.
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As applied, not necessarily to all trustees ex maleficio, but to
the facts of the Cameron case, there seems an inherent justice in
the decision. A Wide difference exists between solvency and insolvency. One depositing trust funds in a solvent institution knowingly runs and must run the ordinary business risk. Insolvency
is such a risk. The bank does not wrong a depositor in accepting his
money. That is one purpose for which it is chartered. The wrong
consists in mingling trust moneys with its general funds.41 Unless
the institution thereafter becomes insolvent, the beneficiary has lost
nothing. Comparatively speaking, insolvencies are not numerous.
Hence, such wrongs frequently result in no pecuniary loss.
I On the other hand, a bank which to its knowledge is insolvent,
cannot rightfully accept further deposits.4 2 The first wrong consists in receiving the fund; the second in mingling it with the general money. In this instance, the depositor is not running an ordinary
business risk. The bank is not. even in business. It is insolvent.
Its wrongful acts have deprived the unwitting customer of any
chance of emerging unscathed from the transaction without the aid
of the court. In such a situation it would seem only fair for the
chancellor to lay hold of every excuse to make the claimant whole.
The Cameron decision either denotes a change in Pennsylvania
policy by lightening the burden of proof on the claimant for preference in the particular situation involved in that case, or else indicates
the revisal of one of the general rules stated under the preceding
groups. The significance of the case cannot be overlooked.
E.S.
RIGHTS OF A LANDOWNER IN THE ABUTTING HIGHWAY-The

owner of property adjacent to a highway has certain rights solely because his property is so situated.' These rights are easements of access,
"3 PomEoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. i918) .§ io76, p. 2471.
"Railway v. Johnston, 133 U. S. 566 (i89o); Western German Bank v.

Butler, i59 Fed. ii6 (C. C. A. 5th, i9o8); Corn Exchange National Bank v.
Solicitor's Loan and Trust Co., supra note 33.
'These rights must not be confused with the rights which he has against the
adjoining landowner. For example, while most American jurisdictions deny
that a landowner can acquire easements of light and air in adjoining property by
prescription, 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1233, 1276, the same
jurisdictions seem to recognize that a landowner may have easements of light and
air in the highway.
Similarly the abutter's rights must be distinguished from those which he has
in common with every member of the public, to use the way for passage, have it
unobstructed and free from nuisance, and in proper condition for traveling. To
protect this right he has no remedy in his own name. McDonald v. English, 55
I1. 232 (1877); 3 McQuL.LN, MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS (1912) § 1321. He
must depend on a suit brought in the name of the public by its authorized officer.
City of Chicago v. Union Building Ass'n, 102 Ill. 379 (1882) ; (1887) 24 CENT.
L. J. 51.
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view,' light and air,4 and, according to a recent case,5 of shade from
trees growing in the highway. The theory upon which these rights
are based is that when this land was purchased, condemned or dedicated, 6 it was turned over to the public solely for a highway, and the
common uses attendant thereto; that the abutter retained the right to
enjoy his adjoining land without any intrusion thereon except that
which would naturally follow the use of the highway, as such, and that
the enjoyment of these easements is not in conflict with this proper use
of the highway.
When the fee to the center of the highway is in the abutter, he
has available all the usual remedies of a landowner, 7 subject only to
the public's easement. Thus he can bring a bill in equity to enjoin
a nuisance," or may abate itY He may likewise bring an action of
trespass" or ejectment."
However, when the fee to the highway is
'Eachus v. City of Los Angeles, 130 Cal. 492, 62 Pac. 82o (19oo) ; Longnecker v. Wichita R. R. & Lighting Co., 8o Kan. 413, lO2 Pac. 492 (1909);
Davis v. City of Appleton, 1O9 Wis. 58o, 85 N. W. 515 (19O1). It is interesting
to notice that although the abutter has this easement from the moment he turns
over the land for highway purposes, after it has become public property it is
generally held that he can acquire no additional easements therein by prescription. Commonwealth v. Moorehead, 118 Pa. 344, 12 AtI. 424 (1888). Contra:
Ostrom v. The City of San Antonio, 77 Tex. 345, 14 S. W. 66 (i89o) ; see 2
ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS (4th ed. 1926) §§ 1187, 1188.
'Abutter has right of view from his premises, and the right to have his
premises in view of prospective customers. First Nat. Bank v. Tyson, 133 Ala.
459, 32 So. 144 (igoi) ; Brown-Brand Realty Co. v. Salis Co., 126 Misc. 336,
214 N. Y. Supp. 230 (1926) ; comment on latter case (1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 485.

'Field v. Barling, 149 Ill. 556, 37 N. E. 850 (1894) ; Townsend v. Eynstein,
93 Md. 537, 49 Atl. 629 (19OI). However no recovery will be granted abutter
for noise. Aldrich v. Metropolitan West Side R. R., 195 Ill. 456, 63 N. E. 155
(1902) ; American Bank Note Co. v. New York Elevated R. R., 12o N. Y. 252,
29 N. E. 302 (1891).
On the proposition that an abutting landowner has easements of light, air and view: World Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 113 Neb.
396, 203 N. W. 574 (1925) ; (1924) 97 CENT. L. J. 273; (1924) 24 COL. L. REv.
9 MARQ. L. REV. 124; 3 McQuILLin, op cit. supra note i, § 1322.
'A tree warden was held liable in damages for cutting down, without proper

925; (1925)

authority from municipal corporation, two shade trees on the highway abutting
plaintiff's property, fee to which seems to have been in the municipality. Skinner v. Buchanon, 142 Atl. 72 (Vt. 1928).

'When land is dedicated to the public, the latter gets only that interest in the

land which is necessary for the use to which it was dedicated. Lade v. Shepherd,
2 Strange 1004 (Eng. 1735).
The same is true when property is condemned.
Newton v. City of Newton, I88 Mass. 226, 74 N. E. 346 (1905) ; 4 McQurLLIN,

op. cit. supra note

I,

§ 1598. A similar rule applies, though statutes may authorize

taking of the fee. Fairchild v. St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540, 49 N. W. 325 (18gi).
'2 ELLioTT, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 896, 897.
'Harbach v. Des Moines & Kansas City R. R., 8o Iowa 5g3, 44 N. W. 348
(189o) ; Mackey v. Aycock, 83 Okla. 175, 201 Pac. 365 (1921).

'Danville & Gravel Road Co. v. Campbell, 87 Ind. 57 (1882).
"0Clark v. Dasso, 34 Mich. 86 (1876) ; Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 49 (1871) ; see
Chambers v. Furry, i Yeates 167, 169 (Pa. 1792).

"Terre Haute & S. E. R. R. v. Rodel, 89 Ind. 128 (1883) ; Bork v. United
N. J. R. R. & Canal Co., 7o N. J. L. 268, 57 Atl. 412 (1903) ; Eels v. American
Telegraph & Telephone Co., 143 N. Y. 133, 38 N. E. 202 (894).

NOTES

in the municipal corporation his appropriate remedy is an action on
the case at law,"2 or a bill in equity. 13
Two factors are considered by the courts in determining the
abutting landowner's right to recover for infringement of his interests: (I) whether the fee of the adjoining highway is in him or the
municipality ;14 (2) whether that which interferes with the abutter's
rights is a burden on the fee additional to that which the parties
contemplated as a natural use of the highway, when the land was
turned into a highway.' 5
The question, who owns the fee, may be of great importance
when the ownership of the highway apart 16 from its use as a public
way is in issue. However, when determining whether the abutter's
rights to easements in the highway have been infringed, aside from
the procedural differences before mentioned, the better view seems
to be that this is immaterial.' 7 Mr. Dillon, in his work on Municipal
Corporations,' 8 supports this view:
".. . if the fee is in the public, the lawful rights of the adjoining owners are in their nature equitable easements; if the
fee is in the abutter, his rights in and over the street are in
their nature legal, but

.

.

.

the extent of such rights is in

either event, perhaps precisely the same."
It seems that the deciding factor in determining the abutter's
right to recovery is and should be the question whether that which
12City of Pelin v. Brereton, 67 Ill. 477 (1873) ; Lansing v. Wiswall,

5 Denlo

213 (N. Y. 1848) ; BALLANTINE, SHIPMAN ON COMMON-LAw PLEADING (3d ed.
I923) 91, 92.

'Story

v. New York Elevated R. R., go N. Y. 122 (882);

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. x9Ii) § 1134.

3 DILLON,

" Stetson v. Chicago & Evanston R. R., 75 111. 74 (1874) ; Carson v. Central
R. R., 35 Cal. 325 (1868); LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAix

(1888)

§ 113; JONES,

TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE COMPANIES (2d ed: x916) § 115.

IBoard of Trade Telegraph Co. v. Barnett, 107 Ill. 507 (1883) ; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Montgomery Co. Passenger Ry., 167 Pa. 62, 31 Ati. 468 (1895);
28 AMERICAN & ENG. ENC. OF LAW (2d ed. 19o4) 540.

" In the controversy, who owns the minerals under the surface of the highway, the abutter will succeed only if he owns the fee. Suflield v. Hathaway, 44
Conn. 52! (1877) (spring water) ; Hamby v. City of Dawson Springs, 126 Ky.
451, 104 S. W. 259 (19o7) (mineral spring) ; Rich v. City of Minneapolis, 37
Minn. 423, 35 N. W. 2 (1887).
'Lovejoy v. Campbell, i6 S. D. 23!, 92 N. W. 24 (i92); Southwestern
Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Smithdeal, 1O4 Tex. 258, 136 S. W. xo49 (1911);
3 MCQUILLIN, Op. cit. supra note I, § 1308.

i3 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 13, § i136. Quoted in Lane v. Lambe, 53
App. Div. 395, 397, 65 N. Y. Supp. 1O9O, IO92 (i900).
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causes the injury is an added burden on the fee.
Hazelhurst v. Myers :"9

As stated in

"The real rule
. . is this: whether the fee be or not
in the abutting owner, he is entitled . . . to be compensated

for any additional servitude which may be placed on his property
for any use of the highway not incidental or necessary to its
full enjoyment as such by the public."
Following this reasoning, if there is an additional servitude, recovery
is generally granted whether the injury is a necessary consequence 20
of the establishment thereof, or the result of riegligence. 21 On the
other hand where that which conflicts with the abutter is not deemed
an extra burden, no recovery 2 2 is granted unless there is unnecessary 22 destruction of the abutter's property.
What is an additional servitude on the highway? To answer this
an understanding of what is the natural use of a highway is essential.
In early times a highway was conceived of as a way to be used
for the passage of the king and his people. In later years the
ordinary use of the highway has been presumed to include improved
means of travel. But to go beyond this is a total departure from
the original idea that it is primarily intended for passage. 24 Therefore
the correct rule should be that any use of the highway, other than
for passage, is an additional servitude for which the abutter should
be properly recompensed.
Applying this test, the erection of telephone and telegraph wires
and poles is an additional burden, 25 because they in no wise facilitate
public travel. A number of courts have reasoned that transmission
of messages is within the meaning of "passage," and therefore the
instrumentalities requisite thereto are not burdens,2" because the
abutter is presumed to have contemplated their presence when he
relinquished his land. This seems to be stretching the rule too far.
"84 Miss. 7,

II, 36 So. 33, 34 (1904).
'Bradley v. Southern N. E. Tel. Co., 66 Conn. 559, 34 Ati. 499 (1895);
Board of Trade Tel. Co. v. Barnett, spra note 15.
" Brown v. Asheville Electric Co., 138 N. C. 534, 51 S. E. 62 (i905).
'Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 9g U. S. 635 (1887); Iron Works v.
Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 26 Ore. 224, 37 Tac. ioi6 (1894) ; CooLEY, CoNsTITuTIoNAL LIrrmATIONS (5th ed. 1883) 671.
"Adams v. Syracuse Lighting Co., 137 App. Div. 449, i2MN. Y. Supp. 762
(igio) , Moore v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 163 N. C. 300, 79 S. E. 597
(1913).
2 E,.IOr, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 894.
"Bronson v. Albion Tel. Co., 67 Neb. 119, 93 N. W. 2O (19o3) ; Daily v.
State, 51 Ohio St 348, 37 N. E. 710 (1894); cf. Southern Bell Tel. Co. v.
Francis, io9 Ala. 224, 19 So. I (1895).
"Citizens Tel. Co. v. Cincinnati R. R., 192 Ky. 399, 233 S. W. 901 (1921);
Wyant v. Central Tel. Co., 123 Mich. 5, 81 N. W. 928 (19oo) ; Frazier v. East
Tenn. Tel. Co., I5 Tenn. 416, 9o S. W. 620 (19o).

NOTES

In contrast, there is merit in the doctrine that electric light
poles and wires, which feed street lighting systems, are not unanticiburdens 27 on the reasoning in Palmer v. Larchnwnt Electric
pated
Co., 28 that
. . . light is an important aid, largely tending to promote
the convenience, as well as safety of the travelling public; . . .
it is one of the burdens on the fee which must be borne as an incident to the public right of travelling over the way, and is deemed
one of the uses for, which the land was taken as a public highway."
Similarly the general holding that the municipality's changing the
grade 2 9 of the street, laying sewer pipes 3' to drain it, and water
pipes 31 to supply water to sprinkle it, does not constitute an additional servitude, seems sound for the abutter must have intended
that the highway be maintained in the best possible travelling condition.
Adopting the view previously alluded to that the highway is
properly used for improved methods of travel, the courts usually
hold that street railways are not added servitudes, 2 unless the abutter's easement of access is seriously impaired.3 3 Possibly this may
be justified on the grounds that street cars afford a commonly accepted and necessary form of rapid transportation, carry passengers
who must pass over the highway by some mode of locomotion, and
only slightly interfere with the abutter's usufruct of his property.
But steam railroads 4 and elevated railways3 5 gravely impair the
Myers v. Hudson Electric Co., 63 N. J. L. 593, 44 AtI. 713 (1899) ; Hazelhurst v. Mayes, supra note ig. But it is an additional burden where the electricity is for private use. Goddard v. Chicago, etc., R. R., io4 Ill. App. Div. 52&
0902).

158 N. Y. 231, 53 N. E. IO92 (3899).

"Talbot Bros. v. City of Des Moines, 134 Iowa 113, lOg N. W. 331

(1907);

Radcliff's Ex'r v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 195 (1850). But cf. Stearns v.
City of Richmond, 88 Va. 992, 14 S. E. 847 (1892).
' Uppington v. City of N. Y., 165 N. Y. =, 5! N. E. 91 (igol) ; see West
v. Bancroft, 32 Vt. 367, 371 (1859) ; JONEs, EASEMENTS (1898) §493.
"Wichita v. Holland Water Works Co., 66 Hun. 61g, 2o N. Y. Supp. 566
(1893) ; West v. Bankcroft, supra note 30.
'Miller v. Detroit, etc., R. R., 125 Mich. i71, 84 N. W. 49 (9oo); COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LimITATIoNS (7th ed. i9o3) 8o2, approved in Echels v. Evansville Street Ry., 78 Ind. 261 (1881) ; cf. Longnecker v. Wichita R. R. & Lighting
Co., mspra note 2.
' Fairchild v. Oakland & Bay Shore Ry., 176 Cal. 629, 169 Pac. 388 (1917) ;
Mahady v. Bushwick R. R., 91 N. Y. 148 (883).
"South & North Ala. R. R. v. Davis, 185 Ala. 193, 64 So. 6o6 (914);
Theobold v. Railroad Co., 66 Miss. 279, 6 So. 230 (1889); cf. Brannon Pipe Co.
v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 2o3 Ky. 659, :262 S. W. 3IO (3924), and comment on
this case (1924) 33 Ky. L. J. 159; see also 2 ELLIOrT, op. cit supra note 2, § 885;
LEwis, loc. cit. supra note 14, et § 315.
" Mulher v. New York, etc., R. R., 197 U. S. 544, 25 Sup. Ct. 522 (1904);
Lentell v. Boston, etc., Ry. 2o2 Mass. 315, 88 N. E. 765 (909)
politan Elevated R. R., 304 N. Y. 268, 3o N. E. 528 (1887).

; Lahr v. Metro-
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abutting property holder's easements, and are not anticipated nor
compensated for at the time the land is taken for a highway. They
are accordingly held to be additional servitudes.
Three additional factors influence the courts in their decisions.
(i) If it is a private individual or corporation,"6 they are much more
prone to consider the use an additional burden, than they are if it
is the municipal corporation.3 7 (2) A number of states have statutory or constitutional provisions that "the property of no person shall
be taken or damaged without just compensation therefor." Under
such provisions, most courts have rightly allowed recovery 3 for
direct injury to the abutter's property, or consequential damage by its
depreciation in market value, even though it is not caused by an additional servitude, for example, changing the grade of the street. (3) A
distinction is commonly made between highways in rural districts
and those in the city, on the theory that lighting, sprinkling and
grading a city street may be contemplated by the abutter, but it is
not in a rural community.3 9 Consent of the county authorities to the
establishment of these servitudes does not affect the abutter's rights,
and this likewise applies to municipal consent.
M.E.L.
HABITUAL-CRIMINAL

STATUTES AND THE PROPOSED PENNSYI-

VANIA AcT-The Pennsylvania Crime Commission has recently
drawn up ai act to be proposed to the state legislature, which act
has for its object a more severe treatment of habitual criminals.- In
brief it provides that when any person is convicted a second or third
time of certain enumerated and serious crimes 2 he may be sentenced
to imprisonment for a term the maximum of which shall not be more
'Jones

v. Erie R. R., 151 Pa. 30, 25 At. 134 (1892)

(constructing a

bridge); Iron Works v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., supra note 22.
'Willis v. Winona, 59 Minn. 27, 6o N. V. 814 (1894) ; Sauer v. City of

N. Y., 2o6 U. S.536, 27 Sup. Ct. 686 (19o7). But cf., Chicago v. Taylor, 125
U. S. 161, 8 Sup. Ct. 820 (1888).
Stocking v. City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 798, i42 N. W. io4 (1913) ; O'Brien
v. Philadelphia, i5o Pa. 598, 42 Ad. 1047 (1892); Chicago v. Taylor, supra
note 37.
In re Petition of Bloomfield & Rochester Nat. Gas Light Co. v. Calkins,
62 N. Y. 386 (1875) ; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Montgomery Co. Passenger Ry.,
supra note I5.
'REPORT

TO THE GENERAL AsSEMBLY OF TEE COMeIMISSION TO STUDY THE

LAWS, PROC.DURE, ETC., RELATING TO CRIME AND CRIMINALS, OF JANUARY IST,
1929, p. io.

'The crime or attempt to commit the crime of treason, murder, voluntary
manslaughter, sodomy, buggery, burglary, entering with intent to steal, robbery,
arson, mayhem, kidnapping, sale of narcotics, perjury, abortion, pandering,
incest, or any offense committed or attempted to be committed through the

instrumentality of or with the aid of a deadly weapon or gunpowder or other

explosive substance or corrosive fluid.

NOTES

than twice the longest term prescribed upon a first conviction for the
crime in question. Upon a fourth conviction of such a crime, the
court, at its discretion, may sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. If at any time within two years following a conviction, it
appears that a person convicted of one of the enumerated crimes
has previously been convicted three or more times of such an offense,
it shall be the duty of the district attorney to enter an information
against the defendant charging him with the prior convictions, and
if he denies them a jury may be impanelled to determine whether or
not he is the same person who has formerly been convicted. It is
provided further that the defendant need not be indicted or convicted as a previous offender in order to be sentenced under the act.
That a criminal's persistence in his dishonest course of life merits
additional punishment, is not a new idea. Statutes punishing an
offender more severely on a subsequent than on a first offense, became
fairly common at the beginning of the nineteenth century 3 following
the abolition of the death penalty for most felonies. The case of
State v. Ross' was an early one in which the constitutionality of the
severer punishment was questioned and upheld. It was objected in
that case that the law was ex post facto since it took into account
crimes committed before the passage of the statute. It was declared, however, that the extra punishment was wholly for the last
offense, it being in its very nature more serious than the first one
since the criminal in committing it showed himself to be unsusceptible of reformation by a relatively small amount of punishment.
Subsequently other constitutional aspects of the law have been questioned but upheld. The extra punishment does not amount to cruel
and unusual punishment 5 nor are such statutes invalidated as unreasonable police measures. 6 The defendant is not.subjected to double
jeopardy because the punishment is entirely imposed for the commission of the last crime.7 It was then objected that the defendant
is deprived of the equal protection of the law under the federal Constitution since a first offender convicted of the same offense would
be punished with less severity. The answer to this objection given
IMass. Laws 1817, c. 176; Va. Stat. 1796, c. 200; 7 & 8 GEo. IV, c. 28,
(827).
'2 Pick. 165 (Mass. 1824).
'McDonald v. Mass. 18o U. S. 3H1 (igoi); Ex parte Rosencrantz, 271
Pac. 902 (Cal. 1928) ; State v. Moore, 121 Mo. 514, 26 S. W. 345 (1894).
."A police measure must fairly tend to accomplish the purpose of its
enactment, and must not go beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion.
But a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not
only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary
for the protection of such interests." 2 CooLrY, CosTrilurioAr L1irTATIoNs
(8th ed. 1927) 123.
'Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616 (1911); State v. Findling, 123
Minn. 413, 144 N. W. 142 (1913) ; State v. Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 1o3 Pac.

§1

27 (909).
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in the case of Graham v. West Virginia8 was: "The Statute in question applies to all those 'convicted of an offense, and sentenced to
confinement therefor in the penitentiary,' who previously have been
sentenced to a like punishment. The fact of such sentence. indicating the gravity of the offense, affords a reasonable basis for classification." Finally it was objected that such a statute deprives the defendant of a trial by jury, but such is not the case since the
question as to the identity of the defendant with the person convicted
of the former crime is ultimately left to the jury.9
The procedure whereby it is judicially determined whether or
not the defendant has been convicted of prior offenses differs somewhat in the various jurisdictions. In England the early view was
that the former convictions had to be alleged in the indictment
and proved at the trial of the later offense.'
This practice was
objectionable in that it was contrary to the established rule that a
defendant was entitled to be tried simply on the merits of the one
crime at bar and that evidence of bad character was inadmissible.
The procedure was therefore changed and the prisoner was thereafter tried, first only on so much of the indictment as alleged the
particular offense, and then, if found guilty, the jury passed on the
question of whether he was the same person who was convicted of
the former offenses."- Until recently, the older English view seems
to have been the predominant one in the United States. 2 The alternative of proceeding by information, as in the proposed act of
the Pennsylvania Crime Commission, is being widely adopted."- By
this method the jury will not be prejudiced against the defendant because of his bad character at the trial of the particular crime, and
on the other hand the state is not prejudiced in that trial by the
unwillingness of the jury to convict on being aware of the severity
of the punishment.
There can be no collateral attack on the validity of such former
convictions, except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction."
Proof
of the former conviction of -a criminal having the same name has
been held to be prima facie evidence that the defendant has been so
8

Supra note 7, at 63o.
Cross v. State, 119 So. 380 (Fla. 1928).
'Rex v. Jones, 6 Car..& Pay. 391 (Eng. 1834).
"5 and 6 WILLIAM IV C. 3 (1835) ; 14 & 15 ViCr. v. ig §9 (1851) ; see
Regina v. Shrimpton, 3 Car. & Kir. Rep. 373 (Eng. 1851).
"McDonald v. Massachusetts, supra note 5; Weeks v. State, ioi N. J. L.
15, 127 Atl. 345 (1925); People v. Rosen, 2o8 N. Y. 169, IOI N. E. 855 (913).
Contra: State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 16o, 113 Atl. 452 (1921).
'See People v. Rogers, 271 Pac. 351 (Cal. App. 1928) ; State v. Zywicki,
221 N. W. goo (Minn. 1928); People v. Gowasky, 244 N. Y. 451, I55 N. E.
737 (1927) ; Graham v. West Virginia, supra note 7.
' Lakomy v. People, 66 Colo. 29, 178 Pac. 5I1 (igig) ; State v. Zolantakis,
269 Pac. ioo6 (Utah, 1928).

NOTES

convicted.' 5 Although the crime for which the extra punishment is
inflicted must be committed after the statute has gone into effect, the
former ones need not be,'8 nor is it necessary generally that they be
committed in the same state."' The subsequent offense must be
committed after conviction of the former ones, " and a mere verdict
against the defendant not followed by sentence to the penitentiary
in a former criminal action is not enough, 9 but
2 a pardon following a
prior conviction will not make it unavailable. 1
The proposed Pennsylvania legislation is based on certain sections of the New York Penal Law,2' popularly known as the "Bauwnes
Law," which has been the model for a number of habitual-criminal
statutes that have been adopted very recently in some of the states. 22
The New York Legislature increased the prison terms of persons
convicted of a second or third felony or attempt to commit a felony
and declared that the judges shall sentence fourth offenders to life
imprisonment. Provision is made for proceeding by information
against persons convicted of felonies charging them with prior offenses, and a duty is imposed upon prison and police officials to
report such prior convictions to the district attorneys. This statute
differs from the proposed Pennsylvania legislation mainly in that all
felonies are subject to the increased punishment rather than merely
certain more serious ones.23 Secondly, the New York law has been
declared to be mandatory, 24 whereas in Pennsylvania the extra punishment would be at the discretion of the court. Finally in New
York, the filing of an information charging the defendant with
former offenses may be at any time either after sentence or conviction
and regardless of the number of former convictions,2 5 whereas, in
Pennsylvania, the information would have to be filed within two
years of the conviction 26 and apparently only where the defendant
is charged with three or more of the specified crimes. The New
York law, in common with that proposed in Pennsylvania, is somewhat less severe than those of some of the other States, in that vio-

"'State v. West,

221 N. W. 9o3 (Minn. 1928).
"6Commonwealth v. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579 (1891); Jones
v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 646, i33 Pac. 249 (913).
'7Connecticut v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 6b8, io Atl. 552 (192); State v. Le

Pitre, supra note 7.
M
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 17o Ky. 400, 186 S. W. 132 (i916).
"Commonwealth v. McDermott, 224 Pa. 363, 73 At. 427 (1909).
Herndon v. Commonwealth, io5 Ky. 197, 48 S. W. 989 (1898).
'N. Y. CONs. LAWs ANN. (Supp 1927) §§ 1941, 1942, 1943.
CAT. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 644 as amended by Cal. .Stat. 1927, p.

io66; FLA. LAws 1927, C. 12022; MINN. LAWs 1927,
' Supra note 2.
"People v. Gowasky, supra note 13, at 465.

C. 236.

= § 1943.
'See

State v. Zywicki,

221

N. W. 9oo, 901 (Minn., 1928).
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lations of state or national prohibition acts cannot be included as a
prior offense."
The method by which England deals with its habitual criminals
forms a striking contrast to that of New York. The English Prevention of Crimes Act of 1908 21 provides in effect that where a person
is convicted of a crime and subsequently admits or is found by a
jury to be a habitual criminal, the court may impose, beside the
ordinary sentence of penal servitude, an additional sentence that
the defendant be detained for a further period of between five and
ten years on determination of the penal servitude. However, he shall
not be found to be a habitual criminal unless it is proved that
since reaching the age of sixteen he has at least three times
previously to the crime charged been convicted of crime and has
been leading a persistently dishonest and criminal life. The rules
of the prison in which a convict is serving under a sentence of
preventive detention are modified in the direction of a less rigorous
treatment and the convicts are subjected to reformative influences
and are employed in some work which will enable them to learn
how to earn an honest livelihood. The Secretary of State may at
any time after three years of penal servitude convert the residue of
that sentence into one of preventive detention. Under the Act
the defendant is given every safeguard to prevent his being unjustly branded a habitual criminal.29 It may readily be observed
that the purpose of the Act is not punitive and perpetual isolation
as under the "Baulnws Lazd" but is rather a non-punitive isolation
for the purpose of reformation. 30
Admitting that certain criminals are not susceptible of reformation by ordinary terms of imprisonment and are in fact habitual
criminals, that they should be dealt with as such would not seem to
be open to controversy, but the type of statute which is most effective
is difficult to determine. A severely punitive and inelastic statute
invites evasion in three ways: acquittals by the jury, acceptance of
pleas of guilty of misdemeanors by the judge,31 and the development
' The N. Y. State Prohibition Act; N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 155 § 1210-1218,
was repealed by N. Y. Laws 1923, c. 871. Crimes committed previously outside
New York State may be charged against the defendant only if they would
amount to a felony if committed within the State.
"8 RDv. VII. C.59 (19o8).
Rex v. Sullivan, 78 J. P. Rep. 142 (Eng. 1913).
'ALEXANDER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1915) 188.
' In Dodd v. Martin, 248 N. Y. 394, 162 N. E. 293 (1Q28), a man pleaded
guilty to a felony as a first offender and was sentenced to the penitentiary.
Subsequently an information was filed against him charging him with prior
offenses. The trial judge allowed him to withdraw the plea of guilt:- of a felony
and enter a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor. The district attorney obtained a
writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to restore the former conviction
and sentence the prisoner to the extra imprisonment. The Court of Appeals

NOTES
of technicalities by the Appellate Court. 32
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In

this respect the pro-

posed Pennsylvania legislation, which is expressly discretionary and
confined to the punishment of major felonies, is clearly superior to
the fourth offender act of New York. In comparison to the English Act, while the Pennsylvania theory of treatment is equally
individualistic I" and its greater severity is clearly justifiable, it lacks
the reformative feature of the former which undoubtedly would make
it more humane and more popular.
T.V.
sustained the contention of the district attorney. See also People v. Simmons,
226 N. Y. Supp. 397 i927), in which case the trial judge refused to follow the
Court of Appeals in People v. Gowasky, supra note 13, and declared that the
extra punishment was not mandatory.
' See dissenting opinion of Lehman, J., in People v. Gowasky, supra note 13;
State v. Olson, 2oo Iowa 66o, 204 N. W. 278 (1925) ; McKay v. Comm., 137
Va. 826, 120 S. E. 138 (1923).
. Compare: Junckerstorff, Principal Characteristicsof Legal Policy in the
Present European Drafts of Criminal Laws: a Comparative Study, (1929)
77 U. oF PA. L. REV. 498.

